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Introduction 
One of the most important shifts in China Studies scholarship in the past few years is 
the recognition that economic activity in China under reform continues to depend on 
government planning. By contrast, research in the 1980s and 1990s generally adopted the 
perspective of transition theory and economic decentralization, which has assumed that 
marketization in China proceeds from dismantling central government control over the 
socialist planned economy (Nee, 1989; Naughton, 1995; Walder, 1996). Instead, current 
research is giving renewed consideration to dynamic relationships between the government 
and the economy, including the power of single-party rule in economic decision-making 
(Shih, 2009; Walter and Howie, 2011). For example, Victor Shih’s (2009) work definitively 
argues that the politics of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) factions under reform have led to 
rounds of decentralization and recentralization of monetary control through the banking 
system, which affects economic activity at all scales.  
In this paper, I posit that the effects of de/recentralization have also impacted 
urbanization and its contribution to the domestic economy, and examine the relationship 
between state power dynamics and urban development through the spatial administrative 
hierarchy. The spatial administrative hierarchy is China’s system of hierarchically organized 
nested territories, including provinces, cities, counties, and towns, in which offices of 
different branches of government exist at each level of the system. Decentralization takes 
place when the central government allows lower level government offices more control over 
crucial economic decision-making. Recentralization takes place when the central government 
compels local governments to relinquish some power and restores higher-level authority.  
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Thus by contrast to past research that treated decentralization as a transitional process 
leading to diminished power of the central state, this analysis assumes that the central 
government maintains authoritarian power and that particular state powers are distributed via 
de/recentralization in the governing system. From these understandings, the administrative 
hierarchy, as a system of territorial government, is the ‘site’ of processes of decentralization 
and recentralization, and serves as context for research on the role of the state in general and 
specific processes of change.  
The spatial administrative hierarchy in China is in some ways similar to any system of 
government and territorial organization in a large country. Its differences demonstrate ways 
in which the state maintains a strong role in specific sectors of the economy and overall 
national economic planning. The spatial administrative hierarchy also reflects the inheritance 
of China’s historical political geography. In historic perspective, the spatial administrative 
hierarchy is nothing new in China: it has its origins in the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE), when 
China’s basic territorial unit of government, the county, was established (Liu, Jin and Zhou, 
1999; Fitzgerald, 2002). In the past millennium, no matter what type of state or governing 
apparatus ruled over China or the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the administrative 
hierarchy has served as the territorial and administrative basis of state organization. But the 
fact that it is so old is also what is interesting: through historic upheaval across the centuries, 
from dynastic collapse and revival, to warlordism, fledgling republicanism, socialism, 
Leninism and contemporary market authoritarianism, each and every regime in China has 
maintained the territorial governing system. To understand the significance of the spatial 
administrative hierarchy, it is worth exploring some characteristics of this transhistorical 
capacity. 
The next section introduces some general conditions of change in China under reform, 
and the problems of relying on decentralization as a singular explanatory logic by comparison 
Provincial China, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2011) 
 
 11  
to consideration of the changing roles of the state. The second section introduces scale 
relations in geography as a basis for demonstrating the significance of the spatial 
administrative hierarchy for economic reform and development in China, and through the 
establishment of two new provincial-level territories: Hainan, a new province, and 
Chongqing, a new provincial-level city. The third section presents a new interpretation of 
contemporary changes to the spatial administrative hierarchy at the urban scale in relation to 
processes of decentralization and recentralization under reform. Conclusions attenuate these 
new observations between state processes and urban change and suggest questions for future 
research.  
Decentralization: market or state? 
After reform and opening (gaige kaifang) starting at the end of in 1978, the PRC 
incrementally dismantled the planned economy and decentralized economic decision-making 
power from central government bureaucracies to firms, farmers, and local governments. 
Decentralization and marketization have been the most significant and widespread general 
transformational processes of the era. Many studies of China under reform have relied on the 
general idea of decentralization, and the cognate transition theory, for analysis of institutional 
transformation including, for example, research on fiscal reform (Wong, 1991; Lin and Liu, 
2000; Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005), education reform (Hawkins, 2000; Mok, 2002, 2004), 
and debates about federalism and the PRC state territorial system (Montinola, Qian and 
Weingast, 1995; Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005). However, in its assumptions about the 
devolution of state power, decentralization has arguably directed attention away from 
understanding the changing roles of the state, and the continuing significance of central state 
power. 
The imperative to problematize and contextualize decentralization arises in several 
arenas. First, considerable scholarship adopting the decentralization perspective assumes that 
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the state is yielding and devolving power, whereas in fact the state apparatus maintains and 
extends some powers while it yield others (Hawkins, 2000). In effect, the state engages in 
rounds of decentralization and recentralization. Second, the implications of decentralization 
as a singular top-down process must not be over-simplified, since powers of transformation 
often do not move smoothly from center to local. In reality, ‘local’ may be any one of several 
hierarchical contexts, from town and county to city and province. Third, the international 
social sciences literature typically understands decentralization through transition theory, 
which assumes formation of markets according normative economic theory. Yet as Haila 
(2007) has analyzed, in the case of the so-called land market in the PRC, assumptions about 
the emergence of the market are often poorly defined and unsupported by empirical evidence. 
In reality, notions about the existence of markets may reflect government discourse and 
prevailing economic ideology rather than empirical realities. 
In spatial perspective, assumptions about decentralization in transition theory rely on 
the idea that the devolution of state power plays out on a relatively uniform geographical 
landscape of market opportunity. If we look for the spatial contexts of transition theory, we 
find them typically limited to the national scale, i.e. in explanations of the PRC as a nation-
state (Nee, 1989; Naughton, 1995). To the degree that the China studies scholarship has 
acknowledged a spatial dimensionality, it has treated the state in terms of a two-tier system, 
in relations between the center and the local (Cartier, 2005). Transition theory has no 
mechanism for taking into account the recentralization and rescaling processes that 
characterize the spatial administrative hierarchy in China, processes that reorganize resources 
and power relations that propel transformational development. The outstanding example is 
the 1994 Tax Reforms, which allowed the central government to increase revenue at its 
disposal by compelling local governments to remit more tax through the spatial 
administrative hierarchy (Huang, 2008).  
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Spatial questions about decentralization bring new perspectives to the process. How 
does decentralization actually work out in space and time? Since economic power is not an 
agent that independently decentralizes or moves – it does not ‘flow’ as a coherent force 
unhindered – what does the decentralization of power actually mean in practice and process? 
The problem at this juncture is the idea of geography or space as if fixed on a map: traditional 
social science research has conceptualized ‘geography’ in fixed locations rather than through 
outcomes reflecting dynamic processes of spatial transformation. Continuing the map as 
metaphor, our focus concerns what happens in between versions of the printed map – how 
and why the state and its governing apparatus puts territorial decisions into place.  
Scale relations and the administrative hierarchy 
Most studies on the political system in historic and contemporary China tend to treat 
the territorial system as a fixed four-level system. The first level under the central 
government is the provincial level, including provincial-level cities. Next in the hierarchy is 
the ‘prefectural’ level, which has historic intermediate governing functions between the 
province and the county. The county is the next level down and the most significant local 
level of government. At the lowest level are towns and townships. From the Chinese 
perspective, government bureaucracies at particular levels are organized in tiao-kuai 
relations: vertical or branch (tiao) relations and horizontal or piece (kuai) relations (Mertha, 
2005). The vertical line of organization represents increasing authority and power, whereas 
the horizontal dimension indicates how governing activity takes place through interrelations 
among different branches of government at a particular level. In spatial terms, hierarchical 
power relations exist between the central government, provinces, prefectures, cities and 
counties. Relations at any particular level (kuai) depend on negotiation between local 
government offices and the role of the local CCP, which may use its authoritarian power to 
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influence local outcomes. The horizontal context also represents bounded territorial units 
represented on maps as provinces, prefectures, counties and so forth. 
Here I turn to introduce perspectives on scale relations from advances in spatial 
theory to conceptualize tiao-kuai relations and state-territorial dynamics. The idea of scale 
relations, as a framework for an analytical perspective, conceptualizes the role of the state in 
establishing, changing, and confirming the territorial hierarchy. It also conceptualizes power 
dynamics in relations of scale, which serve as a framework for understanding political 
economic change in space and time. Thus the scale relations approach understands 
decentralization as a set of institutional conditions characterized by dynamic spatial processes 
and power relations, which unfold through the spatial administrative hierarchy.  
Approaches in scale relations emerged from a literature in political economic 
geography to explain how specific and different levels of social activity, from local to global 
and in any place or country – including home or household, village, town, county, city, 
province, region, nation-state, supra-state region and world or global realm – are products of 
political economic decisions, experienced in social life, constituted through spatial processes, 
and backed by state power and military force. The literature on scale relations sets forth a 
range of observations about the production of scale or dynamic administrative levels (Agnew, 
1993; Swyngedouw, 1997a, 1997b; Brenner, 1998, 1999; Cartier, 2005). These perspectives 
recognize that different territories are not fixed, but that they are constituted through 
historical events and decisions.  
In general, the scale relations literature emphasizes how the state establishes different 
levels of scale, and interrelations among them; dynamic state powers that propel 
reconfiguration of scale relations in territorial systems; changing powers of institutions at the 
national scale and consequent shifting powers to urban, regional and/or global scales; and 
power and resources associated with scalar processes. In conceptualizing relations between 
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different spatial contexts of human activity, scale relations treats political economic power as 
a social process with spatial characteristics and spatial effects. The literature also recognizes 
different types or modes of power and that these powers can be associated with particular 
spatial and geographical contexts (Allen, 2003, 2004). Scale is the context of government 
administration, and an empirical means of spatial differentiation. Scale relations as a 
theoretically informed framework is a conceptual approach that establishes how any given 
scale or level does not exist in isolation but has been historically and socially constituted, and 
contextualizes state-society relations. 
The idea of scale begins with recognition of different spatial levels of political-
economic activity, which are theoretically infinite in their number and positions. It is the role 
of the state, in its governing interests, conjoined with economic interests, to establish, 
maintain and interrelate distinct scales of political economic activity and social life. 
Similarly, scale theory recognizes how political boundaries are produced and instantiated as a 
consequence of territorial representations of scale on the ground. In relation to the idea that 
political economic interests continually reestablish if not reinforce particular scales of 
activity, such interests then necessarily express their powers as a set of spatial processes and 
through actions and events at different and multiple scales, which are often mutually 
influential. Scale processes expressed at one scale often impact events at another scale. For 
example, in China under reform, the ‘local’ state may interpret policy in ways that are 
different from the central state’s plans or directives (see Minglu Chen’s discussion of Sichuan 
in this issue).   
The significance of scale relations in an era of globalization emerges especially 
around the importance of cities and regions in articulating globalizing processes in the 
context of nation-state territoriality. In this era of globalization, mobile capital seeks to invest 
in growth-oriented and high growth city-regions. Worldwide, foreign direct investment 
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disproportionately concentrates in city-regions, world cities, and global cities, which 
contributes to uneven development (Scott et al, 2001). Urban officials regularly seek to 
access international capital directly, working to negotiate across levels of scale and 
sometimes transcending the national level or national government bureaucracies in the 
process. For example, in contemporary Luwan district, Shanghai, in the former French 
Concession, local district officials have directly worked with international luxury goods firms 
to invest in Huaihai Middle Road (Lippo Group, 2009). In the context of scale relations under 
globalization, the city, especially at the scale of the metropolitan region, emerges as the 
spatial territory most suited to the interaction of political, social and economic processes.  
However, the research design problem for China Studies is the assumption, 
internalized in the scale relations literature, of a capitalist or neoliberal state. The general 
literature on scale is based on the capitalist state in Europe and North America and, in its 
neoliberal variants, in perspectives about the retreat or diminished role of the state in several 
social and economic arenas. It is also underpinned by assumptions about democratic 
liberalism and civil rights. The PRC has also acted like a neoliberal state, through limiting 
support of social welfare benefits and by marketizing many former state services. Yet through 
the CCP, the Party-state in China retains particular powers of authority and domination, 
including over the economy and specifically where and at what scale economic activities take 
place. Among many examples, when China opened to the world economy for foreign 
investment in the 1980s, investment was allowed only in the special economic zones and 
open cities of the coastal region: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. At the national 
scale, the state has exerted considerable control and decision-making over the geographical 
allocation of investment capital – the national space economy has not evolved as a market 
landscape. Thus one of the methodological goals of using scale relations as a lens of analysis 
for China is to treat the theoretical-empirical relationship as a dialectical process. 
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Understanding China’s dynamic administrative hierarchy from perspectives of scale 
brings theoretical analysis to questions concerning decentralization, marketization, and 
spatial dimensions of state power. Analyzing empirical questions through scale relations 
informs understanding particular types of changes to the administrative hierarchy, as well as 
how power relations are instantiated at different levels in the hierarchy, and the geographies 
of their social, political and economic effects. In turn, these relational concepts inform power 
relations between and among institutions at different levels in the administrative system. As a 
general framework for analyzing spatial contexts of state power and their mobilization, a 
scale perspective contextualizes interrelations between central and local governments. 
As a matter of research design, translations between Chinese- and English-language 
terms for theoretical ideas typically require some attention. I have considered the different 
possible Chinese translations for the word ‘scale’, and its different meanings, and have 
adopted cengji, which captures the complex meanings of scale by comparison to terms with 
somewhat similar yet simpler meanings like administrative level (cengci), and rank (dengji). 
From this I may formulate scale relations (cengji guanxi), scalar restructuring (cengji 
chenggou) and other terms. In interdisciplinary research, scale may be related to aspects of 
stratification (jieceng), in sociological work or to the scope (guimo) of economic activity. 
Thus scale is the spatial theoretical dynamic through which the project seeks to conceptualize 
state practices and power relations in space and time, through territorial administrative rank 
(xingzhengqu jibie).  
With interest in establishing a broad framework for research on political economic 
change and urban restructuring in China, it is important to note that a scale relations approach 
is not only specific to the modern era but it also accommodates historic analysis. By focusing 
on the administrative hierarchy as the context for analysis of territorial and governing change, 
the approach asks to understand the nature of processes of change and why particular changes 
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have been made. Through territorial and governing changes, what political, economic and 
social goals is the state seeking to achieve? Over time, the cumulative effects of state scale 
strategies arguably propel accumulation and maintain territorial coherence. Ultimately, a 
transhistorical perspective should demonstrate the significance for explaining the role of the 
state and territorial integrity in China and over the longue durée.  
Urban and regional rescaling 
In historic China and in the contemporary PRC, the state has made periodic and 
significant changes to the spatial administrative hierarchy. Recalling that the county was 
widely established in the Qin dynasty (221-226 BCE), the spatial administrative hierarchy 
has evolved over two millennia. In the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368), the province became 
established. The province is the meso-scale territorial unit at the highest level of the hierarchy 
below the national scale. These two territorial categories have continued to exist as the basic 
geographical units of Chinese territory. By contrast, the contemporary state in China has 
prioritized the urban scale: the number of designated cities (shi) has increased dramatically in 
China under reform, and cities have also substantially enlarged in total area over the past 30 
years. The emergence of the city as an administrative level, and as an intermediate echelon 
between the province and the county, is a significant change in the spatial administrative 
hierarchy over the longue durée.  
The increase in the number of cities, and ongoing enlargement of cities, is directly 
reflected in the ‘rescaling’ of counties, i.e., the decreasing number of counties as a 
consequence of rescaling of county territory to occupy another level or jurisdiction in the 
hierarchy. Table 1 shows the changing number of counties through the dynasties up to the 
reform era. The data show that the number of counties has not been fixed over time and that 
some change characterizes the county level. After the province was established, the number 
of counties fluctuates little and then apparently only between dynasties. In the twentieth 
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century, the data show increasing territorial changes at the county level beginning in the 
Republican period. Here I turn to focus on changes at the county level during the 
contemporary reform period. 
The most dramatic change in the county appears in China under reform, in the 
contemporary era of globalization. The data point 1996 demonstrates distinctly fewer 
counties – more than 500 fewer counties than at the start of the period of the People’s 
Republic in 1949. What happened to these counties? The question implicates two interrelated 
dimensions of change: land area or territorial change, including changing boundaries, and 
administrative change including rescaling in the administrative hierarchy. The answer to the 
question is that the counties have been transformed by government into different types of 
administrative units – in the process of urbanization under reform. Some counties have been 
merged into cities, becoming urban districts. Others have become county-level cities. Still 
others were reterritorialized to become new, experimental cities, such as Shenzhen, the first 
special economic zone. Still other counties have not been rescaled but that been given new 
administrative status. One was reestablished as a forestry area and three were named 
autonomous ‘banners’, where a banner is an administrative division at the county level in 
Mongolia, a unit of administration that originated in the Qing dynasty. These examples are 
indicators of the complexity and variability of the territorial administrative system.  
Table 1. Number of xian (counties) in China since the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) 
 
DYNASTIC ERA xian (counties) 
Qin 900 - 1000 
Han 1314 - 1180 
Three Kingdoms 720 - 1190 
Eastern Jin 1232 
Southern and Northern 1250 - 1724 
Sui 1255 
Tang 1450 - 1453 
Song 1162 - 1235 
Yuan 1127 
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Ming 1169 
Qing 1031 
POST-DYNASTIC 
ERA 
 
Republican period 1791 - 2016 
People’s Republic, 
1949 
2067 
People’s Republic, 
1996 
1520 
 
Source: Liu J., Jin R. & Zhou K. 1999, China’s Administrative Geography (Zhongguo 
zhengqu dili), Science Press, Beijing. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the central government initiated changes to the administrative 
hierarchy in association with decentralization of the economy and planned regional 
development. Since then, changes to the system have taken place every year. The Chinese 
and English-language literature on the county describes these changes, but typically does 
explain why they are taking place. Here I suggest that describing the changes is only a first 
step, and that analyzing why they are taking place is critically important because analysis of 
change leads to greater understanding of the state’s political and economic goals. Thus let us 
hypothesize that changes to the administrative hierarchy are the territorial mirror of the 
political economy, and represent shifting goals of the Party-state. 
At the provincial scale under reform, two significant changes stand out that 
demonstrate political economic goals. In 1988, the central government created a new 
province, Hainan, named after the large island off the southern coast, which was formerly 
‘part of’ or administered by Guangdong province. In 1997, it created a new provincial-level 
city, Chongqing, by separating an area of Sichuan province at the head of the reservoir 
created by the Three Gorges Dam. Territories at the provincial scale, the highest level of 
subnational government, work directly with the central government and in each case the 
decision to establish the new territories at the provincial scale strategically materializes 
national economic development priorities.  
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The central government established Hainan as a separate province concomitant with 
giving it preferential economic development policy as the fifth special economic zone. The 
special economic zones of south China (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, followed by 
Hainan) were planned to attract foreign direct investment and generate export-oriented 
development. Export-oriented industrialization was the leading mode of organizational 
development in the first decade of economic reform in China’s coastal regions. By contrast, 
Chongqing represents the central government’s shift to prioritize economic development in 
central and western China. In national economic ideology, the south coast and the special 
economic zones represent Deng Xiaoping’s maxim, ‘let some people get rich first’, whereas 
the turn to central and western regions represents Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious society’ and its 
demonstration of interests in less-developed regions of the country. So whereas in most 
countries urban and regional ‘planning’ is understood as a combination of land use zoning 
and infrastructure construction, planning in contemporary China is a more complex process 
of urban and regional economic development combined with territorial or political 
geographical change. 
Urbanizing China 
Since the 1980s, the ‘city’ as an administrative level of government has experienced 
the greatest change in the administrative hierarchy. Over the past three decades, cities have 
increased in number, from around 100 to over 650, and also in type and administrative level 
in the hierarchy (see Table 2). Some cities have expanded in area, some cities are entirely 
new, while others have been merged and incorporated into larger cities and effectively 
eliminated as distinct places on the map. Research on urban planning, governance, and 
regional development describes these changes (Wu et al, 2007; Chung, 2010), yet with some 
exceptions (Chien, 2007; Huang, 2008; Lin, 2009), the literature does not address their 
formation, conditions of their growth, or the political conditions of the Party-state that govern 
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them. ‘Despite the abundant (…) cases to explore, the themes of China’s local administrative 
hierarchy and its historical evolution have thus far received relatively scant attention in the 
scholarly literature’ (Chung, 2009, 2). With links to political power of the CCP, the topic has 
been historically sensitive.  
Current research on the roles of the Party-state in economic planning affords new 
perspectives on the relationship between urbanization, economic development and state 
power. China’s economic growth depends on production and the ‘urban revolution’ is driving 
growth through infrastructure development and construction. Rapid growth has also 
depended on cities to fuel growth directly by contributing land as capital for real estate 
development. This is the main reason that cities want to expand by adding counties, or why 
counties want to become cities: only land classified as ‘urban’ can be legally leased for 
development. Even so, the state is the landowner and urban land can be leased but only for a 
maximum of 70 years. In most places, local officials negotiate land development directly, 
circumventing market price transactions (Tang, 1997; Lin, 2009). These conditions make real 
estate especially profitable for property developers and local officials. Thus in reality, aspects 
of the PRC’s socialist regime continue in the land management system, combined with 
contemporary opportunities for accumulation by dispossession, i.e. appropriating land from 
farmers without due compensation and other forms of rent seeking. The realities of such 
informal and illegal transactions explain why a market in land leases has not developed, and 
why ‘decentralization’ does not serve as an accurate characterization of the reform process. 
Given the centrality of urbanization to economic and social transformation in China, 
the Party-state maintains particular interests in urban planning and regional development. In 
this section I introduce key territorial reforms that have established new cities and rescaled 
counties. The literature on urban governance focuses on administrative and ‘jurisdictional’ 
geographies, and covers the diverse changes that the central state has made to the spatial 
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administrative system under reform (Liu, Jin and Zhou, 1999; Liu and Wang, 2000; Liu, 
2002). Here instead I seek to ultimately move the focus of inquiry to ask, what are the 
reasons for these territorial reforms? In preliminary analysis, I recognize the theoretical 
priority of capital concentration under globalization at the urban scale. Yet the number and 
variety of territorial reforms presents a more complex picture than the priority of the urban 
scale or general urban process. From a governing perspective, I offer the preliminary 
hypothesis that territorial dynamics reflect debates at the level of the central government 
about control over the domestic economy. 
In 1983, the government began increasing the number prefectural-level cities (dijishi) 
at the level between the province and the county. The ‘prefecture’ had previously existed as 
an office of the government bureaucracy but most of them had limited governing power and 
were not official cities (shi) in the governing hierarchy. The idea of the ‘official city’ in 
China corresponds to increased governing capacity, urban land status, and consequent 
opportunities for economic development and wealth accumulation for local officials and 
entrepreneurs. The widespread establishment of this level of city inserted a new intermediate 
level of governance into the administrative hierarchy. In 1978 there were 98 dijishi, which 
rose to 283 by 2004. However, the prefectural city has not existed uniformly across the 
country, and the number, size and powers of dijishi have varied principally according to size 
of the province and population, among other factors (Chien, 2010).  
The dijishi has existed to govern counties and county-level cities through 
administrative orders, plans and allocation of financial resources. As a governing model, it set 
in motion general urban development and made counties more responsive to higher-level 
directives. Because it exists at a higher level, through oversight it also limited decision-
making power of counties, while increasing the size of the bureaucracy in many places 
(Chien, 2010). In other words, the dijishi has simultaneously exhibited conditions of 
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decentralization (from the center), recentralization (of powers from the county level) and 
increased state capacity, by expanding a level of government and through increased numbers 
of government employees. The creation of dijishi and its relationship to the formation of the 
county-level city accounts for the creation of hundreds of new cities under reform.  
Table 2. Number of prefectural-level cities, county-level cities, and urban districts  
established under reform, by year 
 
Year 
P
re
fe
ct
u
ra
l-
le
v
el
 c
it
ie
s 
  
U
rb
an
 
d
is
tr
ic
ts
 
C
o
u
n
ty
-
le
v
el
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it
ie
s 
1978 98 408 92 
1979 104 428 109 
1980 107 511 113 
1981 108 514 122 
1982 112 527 130 
1983 144 552 142 
1984 147 595 150 
1985 162 621 159 
1986 166 629 184 
1987 170 632 208 
1988 183 647 248 
1989 185 648 262 
1990 185 651 279 
1991 187 650 289 
1992 191 662 323 
1993 196 669 371 
1994 206 697 413 
1995 210 706 427 
1996 218 717 445 
1997 222 727 442 
1998 227 737 437 
1999 236 749 427 
2000 259 787 400 
2001 265 808 393 
2002 275 830 381 
2003 282 845 374 
2004 283 852 374 
2005 283 852 374 
2006 283 856 369 
2007 283 856 368 
2008 283 856 368 
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2009 283 855 367 
2010 283 853 370 
 
Source: China Statistical Summary, 2011, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
Table 1 exhibits decreased numbers of counties during the era of the People’s 
Republic because hundreds of counties have been reterritorialized as county-level cities 
(xianjishi), and urban districts (shiqu). In 1978 there were 92 county-level cities whereas in 
2010 there were 370. The process of establishing the xianjishi turns the entire county into a 
city, which changes the land-use status of the county and the citizenship status of its 
population from agricultural to non-agricultural or urban. Yet interrupting the trend, after 
1997, when there were 442 county-level cities, the number of county-level cities began to 
decline. So not only has the number of county-level cities increased in recent decades, it has 
also subsequently decreased. This is because many former counties have become urban 
districts of larger cities. In 1978 there were 408 urban districts while in 2010 there were 853. 
The period 1983-1985 shows the fastest increase in establishing urban districts, when 69 
urban districts were established in just three years. After 1997, in association with ‘zone 
fever’, or widespread establishment of special development zones subsequent to Deng 
Xiaoping’s 1992 directive, while in Shenzhen, to increase the pace of reform (Cartier, 2001a, 
2001b), the central government halted approving urban reclassification for counties. Instead, 
the new round of reterritorialization shifted to enlarging existing cities through urban mergers 
and creation of new urban districts by reclassifying adjacent counties and county-level cities. 
This accounts for the disproportionate number of urban districts established between 1998 
and 2002. 
What are the governing implications of creating larger cities? If the city is at the level 
of a province, i.e. Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai or Tianjin, then the process of adding former 
counties to expand the city through new urban districts is not a process of decentralization of 
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power. Rather it represents the extension of provincial-level power – the highest subnational 
authority of governing power – across a larger land area. Indeed, enlarging any city by adding 
former counties scales-up decision-making power because cities are by definition at levels 
higher than the county in the administrative hierarchy. Yet because the literature on economic 
change and decentalization is usually kept distinct from the literature describing the spatial 
administrative hierarchy – a specialty field characterized by little general scholarship outside 
China and virtually no analytical research – such questions about reterritorialization have not 
emerged in relation to economic policy.  
At this juncture I return briefly to Victor Shih’s analysis of decentralization and 
recentralization in economic policy. Shih’s work shows how domestic financial policy has 
varied cyclically, according to the following logic: decentralization of economic decision-
making power combined with increased resources for local development generates rapid 
urban land development, which begins to generate inflation and ultimately leads to 
recentralization of economic power and tightening of opportunities by the central government 
at the local level. The first cycle of decentralization favoring increased rapid growth at the 
local level began in 1983. Central government leaders assessed economic growth statistics for 
1982, which showed the economy had grown faster, at 8 percent GDP, than predicted. In 
response, the central government leadership considered how to maintain and encourage rapid 
growth, and directed banks to make unprecedented loans for unplanned development and 
construction (Shih, 2009, 110-116). 
Conditions in 1984 lend context to the dynamics. At the end of January 1984, Deng 
Xiaoping traveled to Guangdong and Fujian and urged local officials to ‘speed up growth and 
relax regulation a bit’ (Shih, 2009, 114). ‘Days after Deng’s meeting in early 1984, Hu 
Yaobang went on his own inspection trip to Guangdong and doled out generous largesse to 
the Guangdong government’ (115). The outcome was ‘a rapid acceleration in lending’ and ‘a 
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frenzy of lending during the fourth quarter’ of 1984 for extrabudgetary investment (116). But 
excess liquidity at the local level began to generate inflation, and when inflation reached 
double-digits in 1985, the central government debated whether and how to slow the pace of 
growth. The outcome, driven by debates between Cheng Yun and Deng Xiaoping, ultimately 
led to economic retrenchment and a more conservative economic policy for 1986. The central 
government began limiting loans, recentralized control, and ordered the People’s Bank of 
China not to fund out-of-plan investment (119). 
Shih’s analysis does not include the spatial administrative hierarchy and only 
tangentially, in referring to extensive local development, addresses land development and 
urbanization. Yet by placing Shih’s analysis of the 1983-1986 inflationary cycle in relation to 
the dynamics of the spatial administrative hierarchy, it is clear that the establishment of the 
prefectural-level city in 1983, and the substantially increased number of county-level cities 
and urban districts during the same time, took place in association with expansionary 
monetary policy. China established new cities in the 1980s, converting rural land to urban 
status, during a planned expansionary financial cycle. This realization provides greater 
insight into how urbanization has taken place so quickly in China: urban and regional 
planning set in motion economic development, while central government directives to the 
banking system fuel investment and rapid development on the ground. 
The analysis of subsequent financial cycles will also show correlation with changes in 
the spatial administrative hierarchy, and in particular geographical regions associated with 
shifting national development priorities. Just as Guangdong was at the forefront in the early 
1980s, Shanghai became the focus in the 1990s followed by Tianjin and Chongqing. Future 
research should give greater attention to how territorial changes in the spatial administrative 
hierarchy are planned and coordinated with economic policy, and how economic policy 
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directives are, in turn, executed in the context of scale relations in the spatial administrative 
hierarchy. 
Conclusions 
The existence of the spatial administrative hierarchy in China over the longue durée 
as the basic ‘structure’ of government owes to internal changes made by each governing 
regime. Both dynamic and resilient, the spatial administrative hierarchy is the institutional 
heart of the historic Chinese empire and modern state. Its long-term stability is better 
understood through state pursuit of political and economic strategies and goals, rather than as 
a fixed and unchanging system, as it is so often characterized in the economic literature. At 
the scale of the province, Hainan and Chongqing each demonstrate how the central 
government creates new territories in association with strategic development goals.  
From territorial perspectives, ‘decentralization’ is a limited description, even a 
semiotic place holder that stands in for a larger set of spatial processes in the political 
economy. Using a scale relations framework to address the political economy of territorial 
change lends an analytical perspective to the basic literature on the spatial administrative 
hierarchy. It opens up new questions, and by asking to understand how decentralization 
actually works, it draws together otherwise separate lines of inquiry to explain the dynamics 
of territorial and governing change. I anticipate that results of analyzing China’s scale 
dynamics hold significance for several research fields, including theorizing the Chinese state, 
which remains one of the outstanding conceptual problems in the contemporary China 
Studies. Indeed, the modernization of the CCP with government reform generates new 
measures of control over economic development and socio-economic planning. 
In future work, I seek to further correlate changes made to administrative hierarchy in 
association with particular political and economic reforms. How do specific reform strategies work 
through the administrative hierarchy, and how are such decisions negotiated between levels of 
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scale? What governing processes are involved in the incorporation of one territory into another, 
such as the incorporation of a county by a city? How do local states negotiate with the central state 
concerning upgrading or rescaling their status? What are the power relations of municipal 
governments and urban districts? Answering these and related questions should begin to provide a 
fuller picture of the actual processes of rapid urban development and fundamental dynamics of 
growth and change in contemporary China. 
 
References 
Agnew, J. 1993, Representing space: space, scale, and culture in social science in 
Place/Culture/Representation ets. J. Duncan and D. Ley, Routledge, London, 251-271. 
Allen, J. 2003, Lost Geographies of Power, Blackwell. UK. 
Allen, J. 2004, The whereabouts of power: politics, government and space, Geografiska  
Annaler, 86B, 19-32. 
Brenner, N. 1998, Between fixity and motion: accumulation, territorial organization, and  
the historical geography of spatial scales, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, no. 
16, 459-481. 
Brenner, N. 1999, Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in  
globalization studies, Theory and Society, vol. 28, no. 1, 39-58. 
Brenner, N. 2001, The limits to scale? Methodological reflects on scalar structuration,  
Progress in Human Geography, vol. 25, no. 4, 591-614. 
Cartier, C. 2001a, Globalizing South China, Blackwell, UK. 
Cartier, C. 2001b, Zone Fever’, the Arable Land Debate, and Real Estate Speculation: 
China’s Evolving Land Use Regime and its Geographical Contradictions, Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 10, no. 28, 445-69. 
Provincial China, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2011) 
 
 30  
Cartier, C. 2005, City-space: scale relations and China’s spatial administrative hierarchy in 
Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space ets. L. Ma and F. 
Wu, Routledge, London, 21-38. 
Chien, S. 2007, Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization and Local Economic 
Development, Environment and Planning C, 25, 269-290. 
Chien, S. 2010. Prefectures and Prefecture-Level Cities in China’s Local Administration , ets. 
J. Chung, and T. Lam, Routledge, London.  
China Statistical Summary, 2011, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
Chung, H. 2010, The evolving hierarchy of China’s local administration in China’s Local 
Administration, ets. J. Chung and T. Lam, Routledge, London, 1-13. 
Fitzgerald, J. 2002, The province in history in Rethinking China’s Provinces, ed. John Fitzgerald, 
Routledge, London and New York, 11-40. 
Haila, A. 2007, The market as new emperor, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, vol. 31, no. 1, 3-20. 
Hawkins, J. 2000, Centralization, decentralization, recentralization — educational  
reform in China, Journal of Educational Administration, vol. 38, issue 5, 442-55. 
Huang, Y. 2008, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, Cambridge University Press, UK. 
Jin, H., Yingyi Q. & Barry R. 2005, Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: 
federalism, Chinese style, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, issues 9-10, 1719-1742. 
Lin, G. 2009, Developing China: Land, Politics, and Social Conditions, Routledge, London. 
Lin, Y. & Zhi L. 2000, Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, vol. 49, no. 1, 1-21. 
Lippo Group, 2009, Lippo Group – Shanghai to house Louis Vuitton’s largest global store in 
Shanghai [Online]. Available: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/65015244/DRAFT-1-PRESS-
RELEASE. 
Provincial China, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2011) 
 
 31  
Liu, J. 2002, Zhongwai xingzheng quhua bijiao yanjiu [Comparative international  
studies of administrative planning], East China Normal University Press, Shanghai.   
Liu J., Jin R. & Zhou K. 1999, Zhongguo zhengqu dili [China’s Administrative Geography], 
Science Press, Beijing. 
Liu, J. & Wang Y. 2000, Zhidu yu chuangxin: Zhongguo chengshi zhidu de  
fazhan yu gaige xinlun [System and Innovation: Development and Reform of China’s Urban 
System], Southeastern University Press, Nanjing. 
Mertha, C. 2005, China’s ‘soft’ centralization: shifting tiao/kuai authority relations, The China 
Quarterly, vol. 184, 791-810. 
Mok, K. 2002, Policy of decentralization and changing governance of higher education  
in post-Mao China, Public Administration and Development, vol. 22, issue 3, 261-73. 
Mok, K. ed. 2004, Centralization and Decentralization: Educational Reforms and  
Changing Governance in Chinese Societies, Springer, New York.  
Montinola, G., Yingyi Q. & Barry R. 1995, Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for 
economic success in China, World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1, 50-81. 
Naughton, B. 1995, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993, 
Cambridge University Press, UK. 
Nee, V. 1989, A theory of market transition: from redistribution to markets in state  
socialism, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, 663-681. 
Scott, A., Agnew J., Soja E. & Storper M. 2001, Global city-regions: An overview in Global 
City Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy, ed. A. Scott, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1-32. 
Shih, V. 2009, Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Swyngedouw, E. 1997a, Excluding the other: the production of scale and scaled politics in 
Geographies of Economies, ets. R. Lee and J. Wills, Arnold, London, 167-176. 
Provincial China, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2011) 
 
 32  
Swyngedouw, E. 1997b, Neither global nor local: ‘glocalization’ and the politics of scale in 
Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local, ed. K. Cox, The Guilford Press, 
New York, 137-166. 
Tang, W. 1997, Urbanization in China: a review of its causal mechanisms and  
spatial relations, Progress in Planning, vol. 48, issue 1, 1-65. 
Walder, A. 1996, Markets and inequality in transitional economies: toward testable theories, 
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, 1060-1073. 
Walter, C. & Howie, F. 2011, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial  
Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore.  
Wong, C. 1991, Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline: the paradox of fiscal 
decentralization in post-Mao China, The China Quarterly, vol. 128, 691-617. 
Wu, F., Jiang X. & Yeh A. 2007, Urban Development in Post-reform China, Routledge, 
London.  
  
Provincial China, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2011) 
 
 33  
Carolyn Cartier is Professor of Human Geography and China Studies at the University of 
Technology, Sydney. She works in critical human geography on a range of topics concerning 
urban and regional change and co-leads the Urban China research group at UTS. She is 
currently completing Geographical Thought and the Macroregion in China: Research Design 
and the Ethnography of an Idea for Hong Kong University Press and Vast Land of Borders: 
Territorialization and the State in China, an edited collection.  
 
 
 
